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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
AE CLEVITE, INC. and LIBERTY : 
MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Petitioners, 
: Case No. 990218-CA 
vs. 
: Labor Commission No.: 97-0538 
LABOR COMMISSION OF UTAH and 




The Petition for Review by Petitioners AE Clevite, Inc. and Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 
(hereinafter jointly referred to as "Employers") is from an Order of the Labor Commission of the 
State of Utah, dated February 26,1999. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Anno. §§ 34A-2-801 (8) (a), 63-46b-16 and 78-2a-3 (2) (a) (1998). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The sole issue presented for review is whether the Industrial Commission abused their 
discretion by determining that Mr. Tjas' slip and fall accident on January 13, 1997, was an accident 
which "arose out of and in the course o f his employment, where it occurred while he was salting his 
icy driveway in an effort to ensure that an approaching postman would be able to safely negotiate his 
driveway to make delivery of large and awkward business package, which Mr. Tjas reasonably 
believed might be delivered that day, and which he required before he could leave on a forthcoming 
sales trip. 
The standard of review for that issue is established as the following, "The commission has 
the duty and the full power, jurisdiction, and authority to determine the facts and apply the law in this 
chapter or any other title or chapter it administers."1 The Commission's discretion in regard to such 
Orders is extremely broad and is reviewed under an "abuse of discretion" standard, in which the 
Court determines whether the Order exceeds "the bounds of reasonableness and rationality."2 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE 
Utah Code Anno. §3 5-1 -45 (1) (1996)3 provides the basic statutory outline for compensability 
of injuries to employees, as follows: 
"(1) Each employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is injured and the 
dependents of each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of and in the 
course of the employee's employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident 
was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid: [benefits] * * *" (emphasis added) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This case concerns a dispute over whether the Labor Commission, following a similar 
determination by the Administrative Law Judge, under the specific facts of this case, must be found 
to have abused its discretion, that is to have overstepped "the bounds of reasonableness and 
rationality" in its determination that Mr. Tjas was engaged in an activity incidental to his employment 
at the time of his injuries. Although the Utah courts have not previously addressed a specific "work 
at home" situation, the specific factual circumstances of this case presented issues which, the 
Commission determined, had previously been addressed on a regular basis by Utah's courts, as well 
as by the Courts of other jurisdictions. 
!Utah Code Ann. §35-1-16(1994), renumbered effective July 1,1997, as §34A-l-301 (1997). 
2Osman Home Imp, v. Industrial Comm'n, 958 P. 2d 240, 242 (Ut. App., 1998). 
Section renumbered effective July 1, 1997, as §34A-2-401 (1997). 
-2-
The Employee's application for worker's compensation benefits was denied by the employers 
on the basis of their assertion that it did not "arise out of and in the course o f his employment but, 
rather, arose out of the personal activity of salting the driveway of his personal residence. The parties 
waived a formal hearing and submitted their Briefs based upon deposition testimony relative to the 
legal issues presented in the case, along with both the written and video taped deposition of Mr. Tjas, 
so the attitude and demeanor of the witness could be observed. In addition, the parties stipulated as 
to the facts of the case.4 Judge Elicerio entered her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
on July 22,1998, granting Mr. Tjas' claim. A Motion for Review was timely filed and briefed by the 
parties and the Labor Commission issued its Order5 on February 26,1999, similarly finding that Mr. 
Tjas' was entitled to compensation because his activity in salting the driveway, under the particular 
circumstances of this case, was "reasonably incidental" to his employment and that his injuries arose 
"out of and in the course o f his employment. 
Employers timely filed their Motion for Review with this Court on March 15,1999, and filed 
their docketing statement on April 1, 1999. Employee filed its Motion for Summary Disposition 
which was denied and deferred to allow for full briefing and consideration of the case. 
Employers subsequently filed their Brief, along with a lengthy Addendum which included a 
"Survey of Other Jurisdictions" (hereinafter referred to as "Employers' Survey"). Employee 
responded with a Motion to Strike the Addendum and/or Brief due to their non-compliance with the 
applicable Rules and based upon the difficulty in endeavoring to respond to that Addendum in 
4See Order of Judge Elicerio, attached as Exhibit "B" to the Employers' Addendum. 
5See Order Denying Motion for Review, attached as Exhibit "C" in Employer's Addendum. 
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conjunction with the Brief. This Court entered its Order6 on August 26, 1999, denying that Motion 
to Strike, but granting permission for the Employee to file a similar, responsive "Survey" as part of 
the Addendum to Employee's Brief. In accordance with that Order, Employee has prepared a 
document entitled "Employee's Survey of Other Jurisdictions,"7 (hereinafter referred to as 
"Employee's Survey") in which he has endeavored to respond to Employers' Survey. Employee has 
attempted to summarize in Employee's Survey the applicable principles of law, by expanding upon 
the selective nature of Employers' Survey, specifically addressing the various courts' guidelines, 
directives, and determinations regarding those principles, divided between four separate headings in 
the various state's summaries, referencing the following, to the extent applicable cases were located: 
(1) General guidelines for determining "arising out of and in the course of employment" issues; (2) 
General requirements for application of the "Dual Purpose Exception" to the "going and coming" 
rule, the general rule of non-coverage for persons going to or coming from work; (3) Specific 
activities in which employees were engaged at the time of their injuries, which the courts found 
sufficiently "incidental to" the employment, so as to compensation was granted; and (4) Specific 
activities in which employees were engaged at the time of their injuries, which the courts found not 
to be sufficiently "incidental to" the employment, so that compensation was denied. Employee's 
Survey also includes cases previously set forth in Petitioners' Survey, the names of which have been 
set forth in bold, underlined italics (i.e., Smith v. Jones), so that the court may readily identify and, 
where appropriate, distinguish those cases. 
6The Court, in its Order denying Employee's Motion to Strike the Employers' Survey, 
specifically allowed Employee to file such a responsive Survey. A copy of that Order is attached as 
Exhibit "B" in Employee's Addendum to this Brief. 
Employee's Survey is attached as Exhibit *A" in Employee's Addendum to this Brief. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The determination of whether a particular activity is within the scope of employment is 
generally highly fact-dependent. "Indeed, our prior case law recognizes that 'whether or not the 
injury arises out of or within the scope of employment depends upon the particular facts of each 
case.'"8 It is thus vitally important that all of the relevant facts be considered in determining a 
workers compensation case, as was done by Judge Elicerio and, subsequently, by the Commission. 
The Commission's Findings of Fact, which are not disputed by Employers,9 include the following: 
"Mr. Tjas, a resident of Salt Lake City, was employed by Clevite as a district 
sales manager for Utah, Idaho, Wyoming, Montana and parts of Nevada. Clevite did 
not maintain an office in Salt Lake City, but authorized Mr. Tjas to use his personal 
residence as abase of operations for his work. To that end, Clevite provided Mr. Tjas 
with a computer, printer, telephone line, telephone and answering machine for use in 
his home. Company correspondence, catalogues and price lists were delivered by 
U.S. mail or private courier services to Mr. Tjas's home, and Clevite provided Mr. 
Tjas with a car which was garaged there. Mr. Tjas generally made sales calls Monday 
through Thursday and performed office work at home on Friday. 
Access to Mr. Tjas's home and garage is by way of a steep driveway. In 
winter, the driveway is sometimes slick from snow or ice and, consequently, is 
hazardous to cars and pedestrians. It was Mr. Tjas's practice to remove the snow 
from the driveway, then spread salt on the driveway surface. 
The night before Mr. Tjas' accident, several inches of snow fell in Salt Lake 
City. Tr - next morning, Monday, January 13, 1997, Mr. Tjas drove to several local 
sales calls, but did not first clear the snow from his sidewalk and driveway. Instead, 
Mr. Tjas's son cleared the snow while Mr. Tjas was making his sales calls. However, 
the driveway remained icy. 
After returning home in mid-afternoon, Mr. Tjas spent the next hour loading 
his car with material for an upcoming sales trip to Montana. He had been told by 
Clevite to expect delivery of a large package to be used in connection with the trip. 
Mr. Tjas did not know whether the package was to be delivered by U.S. mail or by 
a private carrier and he was not certain whether it would be delivered that day or the 
8State Tax Comm'n v. Industrial Common. 685 P. 2d 1051 , 1053 (Utah, 1984). 
9See Employers' Docketing Statement, paragraph 8 (b), which states, 'This appeal concerns 
the Labor Commission's application of law to the particular facts of this case." 
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next. Nevertheless, when Mr. Tjas observed his mailman approaching he decided to 
spread salt on his driveway to enable the postman to safely negotiate the driveway and 
make his delivery to the Tjas residence. 
Mr. Tjas slipped and fell while spreading the salt, thereby suffering the injury 
for which he now seeks workers' compensation benefits."10 
These facts are reasonably supported by the Record in this case. Employers' Statement of 
Facts has rather selectively set forth only their own interpretation of those facts, some of which are 
in need of correction or clarification. 
First, it should be noted that the Employers' assertion that, "Mr. Tjas was aware that a city 
ordinance required all homeowners to clear snow and ice from their sidewalks and driveways"11 does 
not accurately reflect the evidence. Rather, Mr. Tjas' testimony about the ordinance was as to 
clearing "snow" off the "sidewalks," with no mention of clearing driveways nor of any requirement 
to clear "ice." Further, the ordinance requires only that snow be cleared from sidewalks within the 
specified 24-hour limitation, it addresses neither driveways nor "ice." 
Further, the inaccurate and misleading nature should be noted of Employers' assertion that, 
in his application for long term disability, "Mr. Tjas specifically affirmed that his injury was not work-
related and he did not intend to file a workers' compensation claim (R. 70)."12 Mr. Tjas testimony 
reflected that he did not, and could not, have signed any such document since he is unable to use his 
arms. Rather, any such documentation would have been provided to his wife for her review and 
signature (R. 276, pp. 65-67). Mr. Tjas had no idea what a worker's compensation injury was at that 
time. (R. 276, pp. 63-64). The Application for Hearing with the Utah Labor Commission was not 
10)Supra, note 5 at 2. 
1
 Employers' Brief at 7. 
l2Id. at 9. 
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filed until June 27, 1997, after Mrs. Tjas had an opportunity to review Mr. Tjas' rights with an 
attorney knowledgeable in the field. 
In addition to the foregoing specific corrections to Employers' Statement of Facts, there are 
several general areas of additional facts and/or clarifications which are similarly of import to this case. 
1. At the time of his injury, Mr. Tjas was employed by AE Clevite, as a District Sales 
Manager covering Utah, Idaho, Wyoming, Montana, and part of Nevada. (R. 276, p. 20) 
2. AE Clevite chose not to have Mr. Tjas work out of a company plant or building. Rather, 
he was required to travel from an office established at his home to his customers as part of his 
employment. In a normal week he traveled Monday through Thursday and then worked in his home 
office on Friday. (R. 276, p. 13) Mr. Tjas also did some work every day on his computer. (R. 276, 
pp. 53, 61) He was required to work 40 or more hours per week. (R. 276, p. 19) He normally 
worked until 7:00 p.m. each day. (R. 276, p. 53) 
3. Mr. Tjas' only office address was 2467 Emmerson, Salt Lake City, Utah, his home 
address. (R. 276, p. 52) His employer provided him with a company car which was to be kept at 
his home office. (R. 276, p. 18) His employer also provided him with a company computer and 
printer to be used at his home office and covered telephone expenses and other expenses involved 
with its operation. (R. 276, p. 61 and R. 275, p. 10) A separate company phone line and a separate 
company phone and answering machine were also maintained in conjunction with the office at Mr. 
Tjas' home. (R. 276, pp. 53, 54) The work area was spread out in the basement with big shelves 
with lots of company catalogs, price sheets and other information. (R. 276, p. 11) Company mail 
and materials were also regularly received at his home office. (R. 276, p. 49) 
4. In making customer calls, Mr. Tjas would take catalogs, brochures, and price lists. He also 
kept a set of engine gaskets in his car to show customers. (R. 276, p. 22) 
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5. AE Clevite generally did not direct Mr. Tjas' activities during his workday, with the 
exception of general memos to company personnel. (R. 276, p. 23) 
6. Mr. Tjas spent between five and ten hours working in his home office each week. Most 
of his office work was done on the computer his employer provided for him. (R. 276, p. 55) He was 
required to spend time on the computer most every day for information regularly coming in. (R. 276, 
p. 61) His work at the home office included preparation for sales calls and notes of items to be 
discussed with particular customers, reviewing which of the 200 price sheets and catalogues were 
needed, and loading those items into his company car. (R. 276, pp. 55-57) 
7. Mr. Tjas was severely injured on Monday, January 13, 1997, on the driveway located at 
his home office. When he left in his car that morning to call on some accounts around town there was 
6 to 7 inches of snow on his driveway. (R. 276, p. 34) His 36 year old son, Jeff, shoveled driveway 
while Mr. Tjas was on his sales calls. (R. 276, p. 35) 
8. Mr. Tjas was to leave on Wednesday, January 15, 1997, to Montana for an automotive 
engine parts show as part of his duties. He returned early from his sales calls on January 13, 1997, 
to prepare the appropriate catalogs and price sheets for the show and to wait for the company display 
for the show which he expected to arrive in the mail that day. (R. 276, p. 33) 
9. Mr. Tjas returned from his sales calls at 2:00 or 3:00 p.m. that day. (R. 276, p. 33) He 
began loading and organizing the trunk of his car with the appropriate catalogs and price sheets. 
(R. 276, p. 37) He estimates that he made about 10 trips from his house to his car to load his trunk 
and that it took him approximately one hour. (R. 276, pp. 37, 38) 
10. After loading the car and closing the trunk, Mr. Tjas went up the driveway to his home, 
still waiting for the arrival of the company display, and, almost immediately after that, saw the 
mailman coming up the street. (R. 276, p. 39) 
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11. The mailman parked his truck across the street from Mr. Tjas' house and proceeded to 
deliver the mail up the far side of the street on the dead end circle and then turned back down Mr. 
Tjas' side of the street. (R. 276, p. 42) 
12. Although Mr. Tjas had no way to know for sure if the company display would arrive that 
day, or if it would be coming through the U.S. Mails or other courier service, he reasonably expected, 
based on conversations with the representative who was sending the package, that the package would 
arrive that day and knew it could be coming by U.S. Mail. (R. 276, pp. 50, 59, 60) 
13. The company display Mr. Tjas was expecting is about three feet long and one-half foot 
wide and is awkward and fairly heavy. (R. 276, pp. 50, 58) 
14. Mr. Tjas endeavored to keep his driveway salted, as well as shoveled, and his son 
generally shoveled it during the week and Mr. Tjas endeavored to salt it when he was around. 
However, he acknowledged, "It depended on the mood I was in and what happened that week. It 
wasn't a set thing, but I tried to do it." (R. 276, p. 59) 
15. Because of the awkward, heavy nature of the company display he was expecting, Mr. 
Tjas was particularly concerned that he needed to salt the driveway for the mailman. Mr. Tjas 
expressed those particular concerns as follows: 
"Q. And why did the package make any difference? I assume you wouldn't want him 
to get hurt even if he was carrying your regular mail. 
A. Well, I would have thrown the salt anyway. But the box is quite awkward, and 
I knew that if he had it - - you know, I've always been afraid of that driveway. 
Q. So you said that the box is quite awkward? 
A. It is awkward. It's kind of an octagonal, different-looking box. 
Q. And so why did that add concern? 
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A. Well, it would add concern because it's fairly heavy, and I just wanted to make 
sure he didn't fall." (R. 276, p. 58) 
16. Mr. Tjas' mailbox is attached to his house next to his door. The postman would have to 
go up the driveway in order to get to the mailbox. (R.276, pp. 28, 29) 
17. Mr. Tjas picked up a nearly empty 50 pound bag of salt, and began to salt his driveway. 
(R. 276, p. 39-40) The driveway did not appear to be slippery to him, although it had been windy and 
had left "a little skiff here and there" of snow. However, when Mr. Tjas reached the steep part of 
his driveway, he slipped and fell backwards, landing on his neck. (R. 276, p. 42) 
18. At the time of the fall, the mailman was close enough that he rushed to Mr. Tjas, then told 
Mrs. Tjas to call 911. (R. 276, p. 42,43) Mr. Tjas has since been diagnosed with C3-4 Quadriplegia. 
19. The company display did not arrive on January 13, 1997 as expected. Rather it arrived 
the next day. (R. 276, p. 64) 
Based on the specific facts, the Commission properly determined that Mr. Tjas' activity when 
he "spread salt on his driveway to enable the postman to safely negotiate the driveway and make his 
delivery to the Tjas residence," was "reasonably incidental" to his employment, where he required that 
delivery for a forthcoming business trip. That was based on a conclusion that the activity in question 
was reasonably intended to advance, directly or indirectly, his employer's interests so as to constitute 
an activity arising "out of and in the course o f his employment. Such a "causal relationship" between 
the injury and the employment at the time of the injury was legally sufficient to justify the award of 
compensation to Mr. Tjas, even if he also had a personal purpose in engaging in that activity. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I The Commission's Order Does Not Exceed the "Bounds of Reasonableness and 
Rationality." 
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The Commission's Findings and Conclusions are entitled to great deference and its 
conclusions are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, whereby the Order should not be set 
aside unless the Order exceeds "the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. In this case, no such 
showing has been made. Rather, when all of the relevant facts of the case are considered, there is a 
sufficient factual basis upon which the Commission could reasonably have found that Mr. Tjas' 
activities were "incidental to" his employment, at the particular time of the injury, Those facts 
reflected that Mr. Tjas' activity was motivated by a substantial business purpose when he was salting 
his driveway. He was expecting delivery that day of a large, bulky and awkward business package 
to his residence, which he required for forthcoming business trip and which he reasonably believed 
the postman might be delivering it that day and, when he saw the postman coming, Mr. Tjas became 
concerned that the postman might not be able to get up the icy driveway with that awkward package. 
In order to ensure that the delivery could be made, he then picked up some salt and began salting the 
driveway, at which time he slipped, fell and was severely injured. The Commission properly did not 
find the fact that Mr. Tjas may have salted the driveway at other times for personal reasons to be a 
basis for denying compensation in this case. 
POINT II Mr. Tjas' Injuries Arose "Out of and Within the Course of" his Employment. 
Employer had an arrangement with Mr. Tjas to maintain the company office at his home, 
which was supplied by the employer with a computer, printer, and by reimbursements for costs of the 
company phone line, answering machine and fax machine. Substantial shelves of work-related 
material were maintained at the office and work was regularly performed by Mr. Tjas out of that 
office. Company mail, catalogues and price lists were maintained at those offices and were regularly 
forwarded to Mr. Tjas by U.S. mail or courier. Given those circumstances, combined with Mr. Tjas' 
endeavor to secure the business package he required from the postman, the Commission properly 
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determined that Mr. Tjas' injuries at home were "reasonably incidental" to his employment. 
Utah law recognizes that phrase as meaning something other than "relatively insignificant" 
or "only tangentially related" to the employment. Rather, that phrase is defined as meaning an activity 
which, although not actually part of the employee's regular duties, is nevertheless of some benefit or 
advantage to the employer or in advancing the employers' interests, so as to come within the meaning 
of an injury "arising out of and in the course o f employment. 
Utah Courts have awarded compensation in a number of cases in which the activities in which 
the employee was involved at the time of the injury were reasonably incidental to the employment, 
as Mr. Tjas' activities were in this case. A determination that an activity is "reasonably incidental" 
to the employment for purposes of compensation is not limited to activities within the "personal 
comfort doctrine" or to activities within the boundaries of the employer's premises. Rather, the 
determination of whether an activity "incidental to" the employment must be determined under the 
particular fact of each case, regardless of the type of activity involved or where it may occur. 
The "dual purpose" exception to the "going and coming" rule has also been adopted under 
Utah law and allows compensation where an employee is engaged in an activity in which there is 
some real or substantial benefit intended for the employer, even though he may also have a substantial 
personal purpose for engaging in that activity. Compensation is not based upon a "weighing" or 
"major predominance" test. Compensation may be allowed so long as the employment-related 
purpose is not merely a minor factor or an "afterthought". In Mr. Tjas' case, the Commission could 
reasonably have found that the employment-related purpose of Mr. Tjas in salting his driveway was 
a substantial factor in his activity at the time of his injury. 
POINT HI Case Law From Other Jurisdictions is Generally Consistent With Utah Law 
And Would Allow the Commission's Award to Stand. 
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The case law of other jurisdictions does not preclude a finding that an activity is 'incidental 
to" employment merely because it is not within the "personal comfort" doctrine or occurs off the 
premises of the employer. Rather, as in Utah, each case is determined upon its specific facts, with 
the courts looking for a "causal connection" between the activity involved and the employment, in 
order to determine whether the activity was intended to provided a real or substantial benefit for the 
employer or its interests. The other jurisdictions have also adopted the "dual purpose" doctrine and 
apply it in a manner comparable to the Utah Courts, so that compensation may be awarded even if 
there is a substantial personal purpose in the employee's activity at the time of the injury, so long as 
there is still a real or substantial benefit intended for the employer. 
In those cases where an employee is operating out of a home office and is injured by a home-
related hazard, the courts of the other jurisdictions have generally granted compensation. The same 
holds true where an employee is required or expected to take work home. Activities preparatory to 
travel have similarly been allowed to be the basis for compensation. The cases cited by Employers 
fail to support their contentions to the contrary or to demonstrate that the other jurisdictions would 
require a reversal of the Commission's award in Mr. Tjas' case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COMMISSIONS ORDER DOES NOT EXCEED 
"THE BOUNDS OF REASONABLENESS AND RATIONALITY" 
Utah's laws provide that, "The commission has the duty and the full power, jurisdiction and 
authority to determine the facts and apply the law in this chapter.. ,"13 The Commission's discretion 
in regard to such Orders is extremely broad. Findings of Fact are reviewed applying only a 
nSupra, note 1. 
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'correction of error" standard, requiring reversal only if a finding is clearly erroneous.14 This does 
not appear to be a factor in this case since Employers have indicated that they are not disputing the 
factual findings.15 
The Commission's conclusions of law are similarly given great deference in view of its 
position and, specifically, in view of the foregoing statutory provision. Such Conclusions are 
reviewed under an "abuse of discretion" standard, in which the Court determines whether the Order 
exceeds "the bounds of reasonableness and rationality".16 Thus, whether this Court might have 
found the facts differently or determined this case differently from the Commission had they been 
occupying the Commission's position, does not establish a valid basis upon which this Court may 
overturn the Commission's Order, so long as the Commission's decision did not exceed "the bounds 
of reasonableness and rationality"17 under the specific facts of this case. This Court has previously 
set forth a detailed outline of the requirements on an appeal of a matter from the Labor Commission. 
"When a petitioner challenges an agency's findings of fact, we are required to uphold 
the findings if they are supported by "substantial evidence when viewed in light of the 
whole record before the court." Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-16(4)(g) (1994); accord 
Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Tax Comm'n, 260 Utah Adv. Rep. 27, 28 (Utah 1995). 
Substantial evidence has been defined as "'that quantum and quality of relevant 
evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion."' 
Utah Ass'n of Counties, 260 Utah Adv. Rep. at 28 (quoting U.S. West 
Communications, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 882 P.2d 141, 146 (Utah 1994)). "It 
is not our prerogative on review to reweigh the evidence. Instead, we defer to the 
Commission's findings because, when reasonably conflicting views arise, it is the 
l4Drake v. Industrial Comm'n. 317 U.A.R. 3, 939 P. 2d 177, 179 (Utah, 1997). 
x
-Supra, note 9. 
l6Supra, note 2 at 243 (Quoting Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co.. Inc. v. Tax 
Comm'n, 858 P. 2d 1034, 1037 (Utah App., 1993) and Caporoz v. Labor Commission. 945 P. 2d 
141, 143 (Utah App., 1997)). See also Johnson Bros. Const, v. Labor Comm'n. 967 P. 2d 1258, 
1259 (Utah App., 1998). 
17 Id. 
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Commission's province to draw inferences and resolve these conflicts." Id, (citing 
Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 116 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1993)). As a 
preliminary matter, before the Court will subject the Commission's findings to the 
substantial evidence test, the party challenging the findings "must marshall all of the 
evidence supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, the 
[agency's] findings are not supported by substantial evidence." First Nat'l Bank v. 
County Bd of Equalization, 799P.2d 1163,1165 (Utah 1990); accord Cornish Town 
v. Roller, 758 P.2d 919, 922 (Utah 1988); Grace Drilling, 116 P.2d at 68."18 
Rather than endeavoring to marshall all of the evidence supporting the findings, Employers 
have concentrated only on those portions of the record and testimony which they believe to be of 
assistance to their case, without reference to conflicting or explanatory evidence. Employers basically 
rely on the singular statement of Mr. Tjas that, "Well, I would have thrown the salt anyway" (R. 276, 
p. 58), as if that statement somehow precludes a finding that Mr. Tjas' activity in salting the driveway 
at that particular time could have been due to his concern that the postman be able to deliver the 
business-related package he was expecting and required for a forthcoming business trip. Such 
reliance fails to take into account the other facts supported by the record from which a finding in 
favor of Mr. Tjas could reasonably be made, despite that statement.19 
The fact that Mr. Tjas might have undertaken to salt the driveway at other various times for 
his own purposes does not mean that he could not have been doing so at the time of his injury for 
business purposes. Such situations, as more fully reflected elsewhere in this brief, are rather regularly 
involved in workers' compensation matters and regularly result in compensation awards for workers. 
Awards of compensation have been entered in numerous circumstances for injuries to employees 
which were suffered while crossing a street or driving home which, at the time of the injury, was for 
business purposes. The approach of Employers in this case would have denied compensation in all 
18Vanleeuwen v. Industrial Comm'n. 901 P. 2d 281, 284 (Utah App., 1995). 
,9See Employee's Statement of Facts, nos. 10 through 18. 
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such cases, since those employees had obviously crossed the street or driven home at other times 
when it involved only personal activities. The question which the Commission was required to 
resolve in this case, as with other such cases, was whether at the particular time of the injury, the 
activity of the Employee was motivated by some business purpose. In Mr. Tjas' case, the 
Commission properly determined that it was. 
POINT II 
MR. TJAS' INJURIES WERE INJURIES "ARISING OUT OF 
AND IN THE COURSE OF" HIS EMPLOYMENT 
It was undisputed that Mr. Tjas was: (1) employed by Clevite; (2) injured by accident on 
January 13, 1997; and (3) permanently and totally disabled as a result of his injury. The only 
remaining necessary determination for purposes of workers' compensation coverage was that the 
injury was one "arising out of and in the course o f his employment. The administrative Law Judge 
and the Labor Commission properly determined that the facts of this particular case were sufficient 
for a finding that Mr. Tjas injuries met those requirements. The Court, during the course of its Order, 
properly found: 
"In the case at hand, Mr. Tjas and his employer had, by joint agreement, turned parts 
of Mr. Tjas's home into his workplace. This arrangement may, or may not, have been 
in Mr. Tjas's best interest, but the arrangement obviously freed Clevite from the 
expense and responsibility of maintaining a stand-alone office. Clevite's arrangement 
with Mr. Tjas did not transform every part of his home into a work premise, nor was 
every activity undertaken by Mr. Tjas in his home work-related. However, Clevite's 
ability to have work related materials delivered to Mr. Tjas's home by mail or courier 
service was an integral part of the employment relationship between Clevite and Mr. 
Tjas"20 (emphasis added) 
The Court then concluded: 
"In light of the foregoing, under the specific facts of this case, Mr. Tjas's efforts to 
make his driveway safe for the delivery of mail was reasonably incidental to the 
20Supra, note 5 at 4. 
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performance of Clevite's work. Consequently, the injuries Mr. Tjas suffered while 
salting his driveway arise 'in the course' of his employment for Clevite." 2l 
A. Under Utah Law, an Accident may Arise "out of and in the Course o f 
Employment when the Activity is "Incidental" to the Employment. 
In rendering its decision, the Commission also relied upon this Court's determinations in an 
earlier case wherein the meaning of the term "arising out of and in the course o f the employment was 
reviewed in detail. Quoting from Buczynski v. Industrial Comm'n22. the Commission set forth the 
standards which have been adopted by the Utah Courts for the purpose of determining this issue: 
"Under Utah law, an accident occurs 'in the course' of employment when it 'occurs 
while the employee is rendering service to his employer which he was hired to do or 
doing something incidental thereto, at the time when and the place where he was 
authorized to render such service.'" M & K Corp.. v. Industrial Comm'n. 112 Utah 
488, 493, 189 P. 2d 132, 134 (1948) (emphasis added). 
An accident arises out of employment 'when there is a 'causal relationship' between 
the injury and the employment' Commercial Carriers v. Industrial Comm'n. 888 P. 2d 
707, 712 (Utah Ct. App., 1994) (Quoting M & K Corp. 112 Utah at 493, 189 P. 2d 
at 134) cert, denied 899 P. 2d 1231 (Utah, 1995). "'Arising out of,' however, does not 
mean that the accident must be 'caused by' the employment; rather, the employment 
'is thought of more as a condition out of which the event arises than as the force 
producing the event in affirmative fashion."' Commercial Carriers, 888 P. 2d at 712 
(quoting 1 Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation §6.60, at 3-9 
(1994) (emphasis in quoted treatise)."23 
Employers accurately reflect that an activity which is "merely incidental" to the employment 
is not sufficient to justify an award of compensation. That is so, however, only insofar as that phrase 
is used to mean "minimal", "relatively insignificant" or only "tangentially related to" the employment. 
There is a major difference between an activity in that category and one which is "incidental to" or 
"reasonably incidental to" the employment. The Commission recognized this in its Order, explaining, 
21M 
22934 P. 2d 1169 (Utah App., 1997). 
23Id. at 1172. 
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"Utah's appellate courts have held that injuries only tangentially related to work are not 
compensable."24 However, the Commission did not find that Mr. Tjas' activity in salting the driveway 
at the time, and under the particular circumstances, of his injury was an activity with only such a 
"tangential" relationship to the employment. Rather, the Commission declared that the ability of Mr. 
Tjas' employer to have the work-related materials delivered to Mr. Tjas' home by mail or courier 
service "was an integral part of the employment relationship"25 so that Mr. Tjas' activity was 
"reasonably incidental" to the performance of Employers' work. 
The Commission's Order properly cited and relied upon prior declarations of the Utah courts 
that an accident occurs "in the course of employment" when the employee is engaged in "rendering 
service to his employer which he was hired to do or doing something incidental thereto," as attributed 
to M & K Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n26 in Buczvnski.27 Whether or not the use of that phrase was 
"mere dicta" in M&KCorp., as contended by Employers, that phrase has since become an integral 
part of compensability test adopted by the Utah Courts. Utah's Courts have declared on numerous 
occasions that injuries arising out of activities which are reasonably "incidental to" the employment 
may be compensable, as if they had arisen out of the employee's normal duties. Utah's courts have 
also clarified the meaning of the phrase "incidental to" the employment, in that context, as being 
something more than merely "tangentially" related, and have applied that phrase in the same manner 
as the Commission has applied it this case. Utah Courts have long recognized that employees 
regularly engage in such "incidental" activities and that compensation should not be precluded merely 
2A
 Supra, note 5 at 3. 
15Id. at 4. 
26112 Utah 488, 493, 189 P. 2d 132, 134 (1948). 
21
 Supra, note 23. 
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because they were not engaged in performing their normal duties at the time they were injured.. As 
Utah's Supreme Court explained in Askren v. Industrial Comm'n: 
"On the other hand, in order for an employee to be covered by workmen's 
compensation, it is not necessary that he be doing the particular task which constitutes 
his main duties, but there are many employment-related activities which employees 
are expected to participate in and in which they are covered. The essential thing is 
that there be some substantial relationship between the activity engaged in and the 
carrying on of the employer's business. That is, it should be of such a nature that it 
may reasonably be assumed that it would be of some benefit or advantage to the 
employer in the operation of his business or the advancement of his interests."28 
There, the Commission's denial of benefits was reversed, the court finding that there was such a 
benefit to the employer as to justify compensation, where the employee was injured in a fall in a 
cafeteria which was operated by a third party and made available for employees' use under contract 
with the employer, although the employees were not required to use it. The Court noted that this 
situation was similar to an earlier decision which had stressed that the employee was "doing 
something incidental to and connected" with the work as intended by the employer.29 
More recently, that Court set forth the following guidelines to be utilized to determine 
whether an injury arose "out of and in the course o f employment: 
"To be embraced within the ambit of 'course of employment,' the injury must be 
received while the employee is carrying on the work which he is called upon to 
perform or doing some act incidental thereto. Nadc xu v. Town of South Berwick, 
412 A. 2d 392 (Me., 1980). It must occur within the period of employment, at a place 
or area where the employee may reasonably be, and while the employee is engaged 
in an activity at least incidental to his employment. Ski World. Inc. v. Fife, 489 N.E. 
2d 72 (Ind. App., 1986). The activity will be considered incidental to the employee's 
employment, if it advances, directly or indirectly, his employer's interests. Id. At 
75."30 (emphasis added) 
2815 Utah 2d 275, 276, 391 P. 2d 302, 303 (Utah, 1964). 
29Id. 
30Black v. McDonalds, 733 P. 2d 154, 156 (Utah, 1987). 
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The definition of "incidental to" employment was similarly set forth by Justice Jackson in his 
dissenting opinion in Walls v. Industrial Commission, wherein he explained: 
'The third prong of the course of employment test allows for injury sustained while 
'the employee is carrying on the work which he is called upon to perform or doing 
some act incidental thereto,' with incidental defined as directly or indirectly beneficial 
to the employer."31 
Other Utah decisions have similarly addressed the "incidental to" employment phrase in a manner 
which similarly reflects an intent for usage in the manner in which that phrase was utilized by the 
Commission, and as reflected above. Hafer s Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n.32 involved a traveling 
salesman who was provided with a company car and reimbursed for all expenses of its operation and 
maintenance. The employee was injured while attempting to personally repair or adjust an overload 
shock absorber on his car while it was on the rack being serviced at a service station. The court 
awarded compensation, explaining that, although personally repairing his vehicle was not part of the 
employee's regular duties as a traveling salesman: 
"Nevertheless, the scope of one's employment includes not only those things which 
are the direct and primary duties of the assigned job; but also those things which are 
reasonably necessary and incidental thereto."33 (emphasis added) 
Since then, numerous other Utah cases have similarly adopted that usage of that phrase. 
Some of the Utah cases wherein that phrase has been similarly adopted include: Birkner v. Industrial 
Comm'n34 ("It [scope of employment] refers to those acts which are so closely connected with what 
the servant is employed to do, and so fairly and reasonably incidental to it, that they may be regarded 
as methods, even though quite improper ones, of carrying out the objectives of the employment"); 
3,857 P. 2d 964, 970 (Utah App., 1993). 
32526P. 2d 1188 (Utah, 1974). 
33A/. at 1189. 
34771 P. 2d 1053, 1056 (Utah, 1989). 
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Christensen v. Swenson, ("[A]n employee's acts or conduct must be generally directed toward the 
accomplishment of objectives within the scope of the employee's duties and authority, or reasonably 
incidental thereto."); Christensen v. Swenson36 ([A]cts falling within the scope of employment are 
'those acts which are so closely connected with what the servant was employed to do, and so fairly 
and reasonably incidental to it, that they may be regarded as methods, even though quite improper 
ones, of carrying out the objectives of employment"); and Walls v. Industrial Comm'n37 (An injury 
occurs in the "course of employment" when it takes place, "while she is fulfilling those duties or 
engaged in doing something incidental thereto."). 
Thus, when the Commission in Mr. Tjas case found that his activity at the time of the injury 
was "reasonably incidental to" his employment, it was not basing the award of compensation on an 
activity only "minimally" or "tangentially" related to the employment. Rather, they were determining, 
in line with prior court cases, that the activity was one which was intended to provide a benefit for 
the employer or to advance the employer's interests.38 
Some Utah decisions, although not actually using the phrase, "incidental to," have 
nevertheless been based upon the determination that the activity was intended to benefit the employer. 
Thus, in Commercial Carriers v. Industrial Comm'n.39 the Court allowed an award of compensation 
to stand for a truck driver who was injured in a fight late at night with two young men after he and 
his co-driver had spent the evening in a bar with a couple of women, who had joined them to avoid 
35844 P. 2d 992, rev'd 874 P. 2d 125, 127 (Utah, 1994). 
36844 P. 2d at 994. 
21
 Supra, note 31 at 967. 
351Supra, note 30. 
39888 P. 2d 707 cert den.. 899 P. 2d 1231 (Utah, 1995). 
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the young men, where in the course of the evening the younger men had indicated an interest in taking 
one of the cars being hauled on a joy-ride, and that the fight arose after he and his co-driver left the 
bar, saw the two young men milling around their truck, and chased them into a field for the purpose 
of protecting their cargo. The Court explained that it was for the Board, not the courts, to resolve 
conflicting evidence and draw inferences and explained, "The controlling test should be 'if the 
circumstances of the employment can be fairly said to have elicited conduct by the employee which 
results in his injury.'"40 The Court therefore determined that, "Because Judd was injured while 
attempting to protect his cargo, we conclude that the fight was 'closely entangled' with his job as a 
truck driver for Commercial."41 However, whether the activity is referred to as being "incidental to" 
or "closely entangled" with, the employment, the basic guideline for compensation is still whether 
there is a "causal relationship" with the employment, i.e. an intended benefit to the employer. Mr. 
Tjas' activity at the time of his injury can fairly be said to come within those guidelines. 
B. An Activity is Neither Required to Involve a "Personal Comfort" Activity nor to 
Occur Within the Boundaries of an Employer's Premises in Order to be Compensable. 
Utah Courts, as reflected above, have not limited their discussion regarding activities which 
were "incidental to" employment to activities within the "personal comfort" doctrine. The Supreme 
Court's decision in Kennecott Corporation v. Industrial Comm'n.42 establishes no such limitation. 
Although that case stated, "A class of activities widely recognized as 'incidental' to employment are 
those acts engaged in by the employee to minister to his personal comfort," that was not a declaration 
that an activity could not be compensable as "incidental to" the employment unless it came within the 
40/J.at712. 
4,W. 
42675P. 2d 1187 (Utah, 1983). 
"personal comfort" doctrine. Rather, that case merely found that "personal comfort" activities are 
one of the many classes of activities recognized as "incidental" to employment. 
Utah cases have similarly never declared that, for an activity to be found to be "incidental to" 
employment, it must occur within the boundaries of the employer's premises. For Utah's courts to 
do so, they would have to ignore the specific language of Utah's statute, which declares that 
employees who are injured by an employment-related accident shall be entitled to compensation 
"wherever such injury occurred."43 Neither does the boundary of an employers' premises establish 
a "bright line" test for determining whether "incidental" activities of an employee may be found to 
be work-related.44 In Christensen v. Swenson45. the Court of Appeals had relied upon language in 
Clover46 to conclude that the second Birkner47 criterion, i.e., that the employee's conduct occurred 
"substantially within the hours and ordinary spacial boundaries of the employment," could not be 
satisfied because the collision did not occur on the property of defendant's employer, Geneva. The 
Utah Supreme Court reversed that decision, explaining: 
"We did not intend to establish such a bright-line rule in Clover. The Birkner criteria 
cannot be rigidly applied to every fact pattern. Some flexibility is required to address 
situations, like the instant case, where the employee's conduct is technically outside 
the physical boundaries of her employer's premises but arguably substantially within 
the ordinary spatial boundaries of the employment."48 
42Supra, note 3. 
44Employers' Brief, at 19. 
45
 Supra, note 35. 
46Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort. 808 P. 2d 1037 (Utah, 1991). 
4
"
7Supra, note 34. 
48Supra, note 35 at 127, note 1. 
-23-
C. The "Dual Purpose" Exception/Doctrine Allows Compensation even if the 
Employee Engaged in the Activity for Purposes of his or her own, as well as for 
Business Purposes. 
Utah's Courts have adopted the "going and coming" rule, declaring that as a general rule, 
employees merely traveling between home and the employment premises will not be deemed to be 
within the course of employment since that is not deemed to be of any benefit to the employer. In 
Vanleeuwen,49 Cross50 and Lundberg,51 as relied upon by Employers, the Courts were involved with 
cases which arose out of activities which came within that well-recognized "going and coming" rule. 
However, Utah's Courts have also declared that compensation may properly be awarded where the 
employee is not merely engaged in traveling to or from the work premises but is, in fact, engaged in 
something directly or indirectly beneficial to the employer, i.e. "incidental to" the employment. 
Thus, in Kahn Brothers v. Industrial CommV2, the employee had gone to the bank to make 
his employer's deposits, gone home to have lunch, and was driving to the post office to collect his 
employer's mail, before returning to his employer's premises, when he was struck by an auto. 
Compensation was awarded because he was found to have been doing more than merely returning 
to his employment. Similarly, in Kinne v. Industrial Comm'n^3 the Court found the driver of an 
employer's tractor truck was entitled to compensation where he took it home during an interruption 
in a trip fron Colorado to California and, with his employer's knowledge, had serviced it there and 
then was subsequently killed while en route to pick up a trailer for the final portion of the trip. The 
4S}Supra, note 18. 
50Cross v. Industrial Comm'n, 824 P. 2d 1202 (Utah, 1992). 
51Lundberg v. Cream O'Weber, 24 Utah 2d 16, 465 P. 2d 175 (1970). 
5275 Utah 145, 283 P. 1054, (1929). 
53609 P. 2d 926 (Utah, 1980). 
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Court again found in Moser v. Industrial Comm'n.54 that such a benefit to the employer was 
sufficient to entitle a truck driver to compensation where the driver had taken the truck home after 
completing a trip and checking in at his employer's terminal to learn about his next assignment, and 
then parked it in a lot near his home, as permitted by his employer. He was burned the next morning 
while attempting to start the truck to take it to work to be used in his next hauling job that day. The 
Court explained that, although the employee certainly needed to drive the truck to get to work, it was 
also necessary that someone drive the truck to the employer's terminal so that it could continue its 
function in the employer's business, and that was a sufficient benefit to the employer: 
"We are not losing sight of nor ignoring the fact that bringing the truck to the 
defendant's terminal also provided plaintiff with transportation to work. But where 
an employee is engaged in activities in carrying on the work of his employer, he is 
within the scope of his employment and the mere fact that he may also derive some 
benefit for himself does not exclude him from coverage."x> 
In Bailey v. Industrial Comm'n,56 the Court again found an additional benefit to the employer 
sufficient to entitle the employee to compensation. 7 ere, the employee was killed on his way to a 
service station he owned and operated, and where he also worked as a mechanic. The Court found 
that the station wagon he was driving at the time of his death was the one he drove to work each 
morning so that it could be used during the course of the day in connection with the employment for 
emergency calls or temporary use of customers. The fact that getting himself to work was one major 
purpose for the employee driving the vehicle was not deemed sufficient to deny compensation, where 
that activity also provided a substantial benefit to the employer. 
The foregoing cases, while not directly addressing the "dual purpose" rule per se, have 
5421 Utah 2d 51, 440 P. 2d 23 (1968). 
55Id. at 25. 
5616 Utah 2d 208, 398 P. 2d 545 (Utah, 1965). 
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established that an employee's activity may have a substantial personal purpose of his own and yet 
still be entitled to compensation, provided that "the employee's conduct must be motivated at least 
in part, by the purpose of serving the employer's interest.'07 
This concept is the basis of the "Dual Purpose" rule, which Utah's courts have regularly 
applied to situations in which an employee is traveling for purposes which are both personal and 
employment-related. The basic requirements for the application of that rule are generally consistent 
with, and revolve around, Professor Larson's analysis to the effect that: 
"When a trip serves both business and personal purposes, it is a personal trip if the trip 
would have been made in spite of the failure or absence of the business purpose and 
would have been dropped in the event of failure of the private purpose, though the 
business errand remained undone; it is a business trip if a trip of this kind would have 
been made in spite of the failure or absence of the private purpose, because the service 
to be performed for the employer would have caused the journey to be made by 
someone even if it had not coincided with the employee's personal journey."58 
Utah's decisions in that regard are also generally consistent with the decisions of other 
jurisdictions, as more fully reflected in Point III of this Brief and in Employee's Survey under the 
"'Dual Purpose' Exception" heading. That Survey reflects numerous cases which declare that an 
injury may be found to be compensable where the business purpose was, at least, "a concurrent cause 
of the trip, rather than an incidental appendage or afterthought. Once this test is satisfied, there is no 
occasion to weigh the business and personal motives to determine which is dominant."39 The business 
51
 Supra, note 34, at 1057. 
581 A. Larson Larson's Workers Compensation, Desk Edition §18.12 (1998). 
59Dombach v. Olkon Corp.. 302 A. 2d 270 (Conn., 1972). See also Cook v. Highway 
Casualty Co., 82 So. 2d 679 (Fla., 1955); Nikko Coast Cruises v. Gulliford, 448 So. 2d 1002 (Fla., 
1984); Shannon v. Bd. Of Ed., 577 S. W. 2d 949 (Mo. App., 1979); Kraus v. Jones Automotive. Inc., 
529 N.W. 2d 108 (Neb. App., 1995); Rosencrantz v. Ins. Service Co.. 467 P. 2d 664 (Or. App., 
1970): Johnson v. Skellv Oil Co., 288 N. W. 2d 493 (S. D, 1980): Bramall v. W.C. A.B., 144 Cal Rptr. 
105 (Cal. App., 1978); Anderson v. Gobea, 501 P. 2d 453 (Ariz. App., 1972). 
purpose is sometimes said to be required to be "predominant," but only insofar as determining, in 
accordance with Professor Larson's analysis, that the activity was such that the business trip would 
have proceeded even if the private purpose had failed. 
Thus, in Ogden Standard Examiner v. Industrial Comm'n60 the Court determined that 
compensation should be granted for an employee's injuries which were incurred while returning from 
the Governors' Ball with one of the principle's of his employing corporation, although there had been 
no business discussions during the evening. Although this trip was obviously not one which would 
have had to be made for the employer at some time if the employee had not done so, and although 
the employer had intended the evening to be purely social, the court found there was some indication 
in the evidence that the employee would have declined the invitation if he had known no business 
would be discussed, in that the employee and his wife had out of town guests staying with them who 
were leaving the next day. Under those circumstances, the court determined that the Commission 
could properly find the business purpose was not "merely incidental or adjunctive thereto" and that 
compensation could properly be awarded. The Court distinguished its decision from that in 
Martinson v. W-M Insurance Agency, Inc., where: 
u[T]he problem presented to the Commission was whether the plaintiff was actually 
and basically involved in the performance of his duties or was mainly involved in a 
social situation with his friend and former employer, and then after he became 
involved in the accident, claimed that he was engaged primarily in a business 
situation."61 
The court went on to explain that, since there was a reasonable basis upon which minds could differ, 
the Commission's denial of benefits in Martinson was properly upheld by that Court. 
Martinson does not require a weighing of the two purposes of the employee to determine 
60663P. 2d 88 (Utah, 1983). 
6,606 P. 2d 256, 258 (Utah, 1980). 
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which is the most predominant purpose, with coverage hinging on that respective weight. Rather, 
that court appears to have recognized the fact that there are two basic ends of the "dual employment" 
spectrum. At one end is the person who should be deemed to be within the course of employment, 
because "the paramount or predominant motivation and purpose of the trip or other activity is to 
serve the employer's interest, and the social aspects, or other diversion for one's own interest, is 
merely adjunctive thereto."62 At the other end is the person who should not be deemed to be in the 
course of employment because "the predominant motivation and purpose of the activity is in serving 
the social aspect, or other personal diversion of the employee, even though there may be some 
transaction of business or performance of duty merely incidental or adjunctive thereto."63 In between 
those two ends of the spectrum, where there is uncertainty, is the wide area where the Commission 
must make its determination as the trier of fact. Such an interpretation is wholly consistent with the 
general rule adopted by other jurisdictions, as reflected in Point III and in Employee's Survey. 
The Utah courts have also applied the "dual purpose" exception/doctrine in a somewhat 
related manner where an employee at the time of the injury was engaged in an activity, other than 
travel, which involved both employment-related and personal purposes. In Clover v. Snowbird Ski 
Resort64 the Utah Supreme Court considered the question of whether an employee of Snowbird Ski 
Resort was acting within the course and scope of his employment when he collided with another skier 
on the mountainside. There, the employee had been requested to inspect a restaurant located on one 
of the ski runs on the mountain before starting his work at the Plaza restaurant at the bottom of the 
mountain. Instead of skiing directly down after inspecting the restaurant, however, the employee 
62Id. at 258. 
63Id. 
64Supra, note 46. 
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skied four more runs and took another lift to the top before he began his return to the Plaza 
restaurant, when the collision occurred. Nevertheless, under those circumstances, the Court found 
that there was sufficient evidence to establish a substantial or predominant business purpose for trip 
to the mountainside restaurant, explaining: 
"Under this doctrine, if an employee's actions are motivated by the dual purpose of 
benefitting the employer and serving some personal interest, the actions will usually 
be considered within the scope of employment. However, if the primary motivation 
for the activity is personal, *even though there may be some transaction of business 
or performance of duty merely incidental or adjunctive thereto, the [person] should 
not be deemed to be in the scope of his employment.' In situations where the scope 
of employment issue concerns an employee's trip, a useful test in determining if the 
transaction of business is purely incidental to a personal motive is 'whether the trip 
is one which would have required the employer to send another employee over the 
same route or to perform the same function if the trip had not been made.' [Citing 
Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance 6 5 ]" 66 
In Whitehead,67 the court rejected the claim that the "dual purpose" doctrine should apply 
because the business claim was too nebulous. There, the employee was merely driving home when 
the injury occurred but testified that he intended to make some phone calls after supper. The court 
found such minimal business purposes to be insufficient to override the personal nature of the trip 
home, where the phone calls could have been made from any other location. 
Employee respectfully submits that, based upon the foregoing, the activity in which Mr. Tjas 
was engaged at the time of his injury, whether the activity is referred to as being "reasonably 
incidental" to, "closely entangled" with, or a "substantial" or "predominant" purpose in conjunction 
with, his employment, the circumstances of the injury could fairly be found by the Commission to be 
compensable. The particular facts of Mr. Tjas' case, demonstrated that there was a reasonable 
5801 P. 2d 934 (Utah, 1989). 
'Supra, note 46 at 1041. 
7Supra, note 65. 
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"causal connection" between Mr. Tjas activity at the time of his injury and his employment. This was 
not a case in which the activity of the employee was "tangential," "merely incidental," or "a mere 
afterthought" to a predominantly personal activity. It was in no manner unreasonable, and far from 
exceeding "the bounds of reasonableness and rationality," for the Commission to determine that Mr. 
Tjas' activity arose "out of and in connection with" his employment when, at the time of his injuries, 
he was engaged in salting his icy driveway in an effort to ensure that an approaching postman would 
be able to safely negotiate his driveway to make delivery of large and awkward business package, 
which Mr. Tjas reasonably believed might be delivered that day, and which he required for purposes 
of his forthcoming sales trip before he could leave on that trip. 
Further, it should be noted that a logical application of other applicable principles established 
by the Utah courts in workers' compensation matters, similarly dictates that Mr. Tjas should be 
entitled to compensation for his injuries. Under existing case law, there can be little question that if 
Mr. Tjas had been injured while driving to or from the post office, or some other location where the 
package had been located, in order to obtain the required package, that he would have been entitled 
to compensation. Similarly, compensation would have followed if Mr. Tjas' injuries had occurred 
while he was carrying the package up the driveway himself, after the postman handed the heavy, 
awkward package to him or after the postman had left that package at the bottom of the driveway 
because he could not get up the icy driveway. If being able to obtain that package was of sufficient 
import to his employment that injuries in the course of those activities would have been otherwise 
compensable, what logic would there be in denying those benefits merely because the injury happened 
to occur on his own driveway or because his activity at the time involved spreading salt on his 
driveway rather than driving his car. 
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POINT III 
A SURVEY OF THE STATUTES AND CASE LAW FROM OTHER 
JURISDICTIONS FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE LABOR 
COMMISSION'S DECISION EXCEEDS "THE BOUNDS OF 
REASONABLENESS AND RATIONALITY" 
A. A Wide Variety of Activities Outside the "Personal Comfort" Doctrine May be 
Found to be Incidental to Employment. 
It is true that various courts of other jurisdictions have used the phrase "incidental to the 
employment" to apply to activities which are within the "personal comfort" doctrine, such as using 
a restroom or eating a meal. Those cases, however, were addressing such "personal comfort" 
activities as just one type of activity which may be found to be "incidental to employment," i.e., not 
directly performing the normal assigned activity of the employment but, still an activity which 
advances, directly or indirectly, the employer's interests. Such discussions by the courts do not, 
however, imply in any manner that only activities within the "personal comfort" doctrine can be found 
to be "incidental to the employment." This is confirmed by the numerous activities outside of the 
"personal comfort" doctrine which such courts have found to still be incidental to the employment, 
as reflected in Employee's Survey. 
Neither do those cases from other jurisdictions support Employers' assertion that coverage 
for activities which are "incidental to" the employment " has been limited to the employer's premises 
or while the employee is traveling on the employer's business."68 Again, Employee's Survey 
demonstrates that numerous activities have been found to be incidental to employment which neither 
occurred on the employer's premises nor while traveling on the employer's business. 
As a general form of reference, some of the types of injuries arising out of employment-related 
activities, for which compensation has been allowed, although the activity was not one within the 
^Employers'Brief at 33. 
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"personal comfort" doctrine, did not occur on the normal business premises, and did not occur during 
a business trip for the employer, as reflected in Employee's Survey, have included: Injuries clearing 
snow or sanding ice in attempts to ensure work could be performed; Injuries during joint business 
and personal travel; Injuries approaching or leaving the work premises along hazardous routes; 
Injuries arising out of hazardous areas off the business premises; Injuries attempting to answer 
telephones while at home but on call; Injuries at home while engaged in required work activities; 
Injuries during company sports activities; Injuries at or during travel for meetings or parties for joint 
personal and business purposes; Injuries at home while carrying company books or supplies; Injuries 
away from work while going to or coming from company vehicles; Injuries while swimming or 
skiing; Injuries trying to protect or rescue employer's property, or while reasonably believing such 
protection or rescue attempt was necessary; Injuries while working on buildings or grounds used for 
both business and personal purposes; Injuries while transporting necessary work materials; Injuries 
inflicted by other patrons at taverns or bars while the employee is there for joint personal and business 
purposes; Injuries while trying to secure, or to repay others for, courtesies to the employer or for its 
benefit; Injuries to employees while attempting to provide courtesy assistance for employer's 
customers; Injuries inflicted by jealous spouses of co-workers; Injuries inflicted on employees while 
not engaged in their employment, but which resulted from actions taken during employment; Injuries 
inflicted on traveling employees by their co-employees; Injuries while riding in employer-provided 
transportation; Injuries to home care nurses going to or from the patient's homes; Injuries while 
traveling between two business premise locations of the employer; Injuries while trying to locate 
personal articles lost during employment activities; and even Injuries to exotic dancers who were 
driving home drunk, after work, where their duties included extensive drinking with customers. 
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As reflected by the foregoing, and contrary to Employers' contentions, employees injured 
by any work-related activities may properly be found to be entitled to compensation, regardless of 
the type of activity and wherever such injury occurred, where the particular facts of that case 
demonstrate that the particular activity was being engaged in for the purpose of advancing the 
employer's interests. Rather than the limitations asserted by Employers, the Employee's Survey 
reflects that the one basic test which appears to run through the other jurisdictions is the concept that 
it is the particular facts and circumstances of each case, often referred to as the "totality of the 
circumstances," which determines whether any given activity in a particular case will be deemed to 
be incidental to the employment or to have arisen out of and in the course of the employment. This 
approach is also in keeping with applicable Utah law as well.69 
In short, the basic guideline is that there must be some "causal connection" between the 
employment and the activity in which the injury occurred, so that there is an indication of at least an 
intended benefit to the employer. The courts have expressed this concept in numerous ways, using 
language couched in terms of "incidental to," "incident to," or simply "arising out of and in the 
course o f the employment. The basic guideline still remains the same in that the employee is entitled 
to compensation for injuries arising out of the activity if, under the specific factual circumstances of 
that case, the activity was not undertaken solely for the employee's own benefit, and was being 
engaged in, at least in part, in a good faith attempt to advance the interests of the employer. 
The Illinois courts have reflected that basic guideline as follows: 
"The claimant may establish this causal connection if the injury occurred while the 
employee was acting under the direction of his employer, if the injury occurred while 
the employee was performing an act reasonably incident to an assigned duty of 
employment, or if the injury occurred while the employee was acting pursuant to a 
6C)Supra, note 8. 
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statutory or common law duty while performing duties for his employ ;r."70 (emphasis 
added) 
The Kentucky Courts have explained it in this manner: 
"The ultimate test is whether the service was incidental to the employment. * * * 
Where it can be found that the injury was sustained while the employee was engaged 
in an activity in the interest of his employer . . . it is within the power of the Board 
to find the accident arose out of and in the course of employment and as an incident 
to it."71 (emphasis added) 
The Rhode Island Courts have further clarified that "ultimate test", explaining: 
"[E]very risk, whether great or small, usual or extraordinary, is incident to the 
employment where some condition of the employment is ca factor in the combination 
of circumstances out of which the accidental injury arose."72 (emphasis added) 
North Dakota's courts have further explained, "Sometimes the employment will be found to directly 
cause the injury, but more often it arises out of the conditions incident to the employment."73 
(emphasis added). 
Some of the other states whose courts have used similar or comparable language to establish 
those basic guidelines include: Arkansas ( "The test . . . requires that the injury occur . . . when the 
employee is carrying out the employer's purpose or advancing the employer's interests, directly or 
indirectly."74); Maine ("An activity is related to the employment if it carries out the employer's 
purposes or advances his interests, directly or indirectly."75); Massachusetts ("An injury arises out 
70Lucious Lee v. Industrial Comm'n. 656 N.E. 2d 1084, 1086 (III., 1995) (emphasis added). 
7lBell v. Lindsev Wilson College. 490 S.W. 2d 145, 147 (Ky., 1972). 
72Corrv v. Commissioned Officers' Mess. 81 A. 2d 689, 691 (R.I., 1951). 
73Karyv. W.C.B.. 272 N.W. 340, 341 (N.D., 1937). 
7401sten Kimberlv Quality Care v. Pettey. 934 S.W. 2d 956 aff d 944 S.W. 2d 524, 526 (Ark., 
1997)). 
75Comeau v. Main Coastal Services. 449 A. 2d 362, 365 (Maine, 1982). 
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of the employment if it arises out of the nature, conditions, obligations or incidents of employment; 
in other words, out of the employment looked at in any of its aspects."76); Nebraska ('in determining 
whether a risk arises out of the employment, the test to be applied to any act or conduct of the 
employee which does not constitute a direct performance of his work is whether it is reasonably 
incident thereto, or whether it is so substantial a deviation as to constitute a break in the employment 
and to create a formidable independent hazard."77); and Vermont ("An act outside an employee's 
regular duties which is undertaken in good faith to advance the employer's interest, whether or not 
the employee's own assigned work is thereby furthered, is within the course of employment."78). 
Further, the courts have reflected that even if by hindsight, it could be determined that the 
activity may not have benefitted the employer, an injury during the course of such activity may still 
be compensable so long as the employee believed he was acting to assist the employer, since: 
"An employee does not cease to be in the course of his employment merely because 
he is not actually engaged in doing some specifically prescribed task, if, in the course 
of his employment, he does some act which he deems necessary for the benefit or 
interest of his employer."79 
Similarly, North Carolina's court has declared: 
"[W]here competent proof exists that the employee understood, or had reasonable 
grounds to believe that the act resulting in injury was incidental to his employment, 
or such as would prove beneficial to his employer's interests . . . or authorized so to 
do by common practice or custom, the compensation may be recovered, since then 
a causal connection between the employment and the accident may be established."80 
Trassa v. Caulfield. 491 N.E. 2d 657, 660 (Mass. App., 1986). 
^Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Devle. 402 N. W. 2d 859,864 (Neb., 1987) (emphasis added). 
*Kennev v. Rockingham School Dist. 190 A. 2d 702, 704 (Vt., 1963). 
'Waterhouse Water Conditioning Inc. v. Waterhouse, 561 N.W. 2d 55, 57 (Iowa, 1997). 
'Guest v. Iron & Metal Co.. 85 S.E. 2d 596, 599 (1955). 
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Under all of the facts of Mr. Tjas' case, it was not unreasonable for the Commission to find 
that a "causal connection" existed between the activity in which Mr. Tjas was engaged at the time of 
his injuries, and the employment, sufficient to justify an award of compensation. 
B. The uDual Purpose" Rule Renders an Injury Compensable Even if The 
Employee Was Engaged in an Activity For His Own Purposes, so Long as There 
Was Also an Employment-related Purpose For The Activity 
As previously discussed in Point II, the so-called "going and coming" rule as adopted by 
Utah's courts generally denies compensation when an employee is either going to work or coming 
home. However, as also reflected therein, Utah has also adopted the "dual purpose" exception to that 
"going and coming" rule. As reflected in Employee's Survey, the courts of other jurisdictions have 
similarly adopted that "dual purpose" exception/doctrine, which is generally expressed as follows:: 
"The test in brief is this: if the work of the employee creates the necessity for travel, 
he is in the course of his employment, though he is serving at the same time some 
purpose of his own.* * * If, however, the work has had no part in creating the 
necessity for travel, if the journey would have gone forward though the business 
errand had been dropped, and would have been canceled upon failure of the private 
purpose, though the business errand was undone, the travel is then personal, and 
personal the risk."81 
Those courts have reasoned that such an exception is appropriate because: 
"An injury suffered by an employee while performing an act for the mutual benefit of 
the employer and the employee is usually compensable, for when some advantage to 
the employer results from the employee's conduct, his act cannot be regarded as 
purely personal and wholly unrelated to the employment. Accordingly, an injury 
resulting from such an act arises out of, and in the course of, the employment; and this 
rule is applicable, even though the advantage to the employer is slight."82 
The courts of these other jurisdictions have also declared that it is not necessary for 
application of the "dual purpose" exception that the purposes attributable to the employer's work be 
;iSteffes v. 93 Leasing Co., 580 P. 2d 450, 454 (Mont., 1978). 
!2BerrVs Coffee Shop, Inc. v. Palomba, 423 P.2d 2, 5 (Colo., 1967). 
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the "dominant" factor. "[I]f there was a mutual benefit, even though the greater benefit may have 
been to the employee, he would, nevertheless have been engaged in an activity incident to his 
employment at the time of injury."83 
As stated by the Massachusetts' courts, "While an employee may have more than one motive 
for performing an act, as long as one significant purpose is related to the employment the employee 
will be considered to be acting in the course of her employment."84 Another court has similarly 
declared that, "[A]n injury suffered by an employee while performing an act for the mutual benefit 
of the employer and the employee, is compensable when some advantage to the employer results from 
the employee's conduct."85 Colorado's courts have similarly declared: "[T]he test is not whether the 
benefits to the employer are incidental or primary, but whether the acts of the employee at the time 
of the injury were solely for his own benefit."86 
The activity in which Mr. Tjas was engaged at the time of his injuries, under the particular 
facts of this case, was one which would readily come within these basic guidelines for application of 
the "dual purpose" exception/doctrine. 
Although Mr. Tjas may have had personal motives for the general activity of salting his 
driveway at various times throughout the year, the particular facts in this case demonstrate that his 
motive in undertaking to salt the driveway at the particular time of his injury was his concern in 
ensuring that the postman would be able to safely deliver the business-related package he was 
anticipating. Under the "dual purpose" doctrine, this was at the very least a substantial business 
83Shannon v. Board of Education, 577 S.W. 2d 949, 952 (Mo. App.,1979). 
84Mulford v. Mangano, 636 N.E. 2d 272, 275 (Mass., 1994). 
85Brenneisen v. Leach's Standard Service Station. 806 S.W. 2d 443, 445 (App., 1991). 
86Brogger v. Kezer, 626 P. 2d 700, 703 (App., 1980). 
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purpose which would justify a determination that his activity at the time of his injuries was 
"reasonably incidental" to his employment and arose "out of and in the course" of his employment. 
Whether or not the mailman actually had the package to deliver that day is neither relevant nor 
material to this case, in light of the fact that Mr. Tjas reasonably believed that the postman might 
attempt to deliver it at that time.87 
C. Where a Home Office Has Been Established, Injuries Arising Out of a Hazard at 
Home May, Under The Particular Facts of The Case, Justify an Award of 
Compensation 
As previously reflected in the Statement of Facts, Mr. Tjas' maintained a complete home 
office of Employer at his home, including computer, printer, phones, fax machine, answer machine, 
and furniture to allow him to perform his employer's work at that location. His employer maintained 
no other office in Salt Lake, the equipment for the home office was provided by or paid for by 
Employer, and company correspondence, catalogues and price lists were delivered by U.S. mail or 
private courier services to Mr. Tjas's home. The company car was also maintained at the home.88 
Under such circumstances, the courts of various jurisdictions have declared that compensation may 
properly be awarded to an employee for hazards confronted in the home setting in connection with 
the performance of the employers' work. As Professor Larson concluded: 
". . . once it is established that the home premises are also the work premises,... it 
follows that the hazards of home premises encountered in connection with the 
performance of the work are also hazards of the employment."89 
Professor Larson has also explained that, when endeavoring to determine whether the home can be 
said to be an actual place of employment, there are three principle "indicia" to be considered: 
%1
 Supra, note 79. 
u
 Supra, note 5 at 2. 
891 Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, §18.34. 
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"[W]hen reliance is placed upon the status of the home as a place of employment 
generally, instead of or in addition to the existence of a specific work assignment at 
the end of a particular homeward trip, three principle indicia may be looked for: the 
quantity and regularity of work performed at home; the continuing presence of work 
equipment at home; and special circumstances of the particular employment make it 
necessary and not merely personally convenient to work at home."90 
Cases from other jurisdictions provide substantial support for these conclusions In Joe 
Ready's Shell Station and Cafe v. Ready,91 the claimant was a bookkeeper for the business who 
performed her duties in her own home on her couch before going to bed each night. One evening, 
she was confronted with a shotgun which had been left on the couch by another person earlier in the 
day and which she needed to move, in order to proceed with her work. As she moved the gun, it 
went off and she was injured. The Court awarded compensation, explaining, "Since it became 
necessary to remove the gun in order to proceed with her work, the injury which she received was 
necessarily connected with the work of her employment."92 
Similarly, in Kavcee Coal Co. v. Short,93 the employee had a home office with equipment paid 
for by employer including office furniture and a phone. The court found that the regularity of work 
at home and quantify of work performed at home were "such that it can be genuinely and not 
fictitiously said that the home has become part of the employment premises."94 Due to the home 
becoming part of the employment premises, the court found that injury during travel from the home 
office to another work site was an one "arising out of his employment" and allowed compensation. 
90Id. at §18.32. 
9165 So. 2d 268, 270 (Miss., 1953). 
92Id. 
93450 S.W. 2d 262 (Ct. App., Ky, 1970). 
94Id. at 265. 
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In Black River Dairy Prod. Inc. v. Dept. of Industry, Labor and Human Relations,95 a similar 
determination was made by the court. There, a pizza salesman worked out of his home, including 
doing all of the bookwork and sales calls at his home, and was injured as he was walking from his 
home to the truck, under the circumstances more fully addressed previously in this brief. The Court 
explained: 
"The employer did not provide the premises nor the means to perform this service at 
was not only beneficial to the employer but essential. Smith had to perform this 
service on his own premises. * * * The employer was not only aware of the extent 
to which Smith was using his own premises for the benefit of the employer but 
obviously approved of the practice by giving Smith $20.00 per week for his phone 
calls, electrical expense and promotion expense."96 
Citing the three principle indicia reflected by Professor Larson97, and applying those indicia to the 
facts of that case, the Court found that the Petitioner was entitled to compensation. 
Similarly, in Watson v. Graphic Management Systems,98, benefits awarded for a woman who 
was murdered in her home were upheld, since the woman had been working for her employer in her 
home office at the time. The court noted there was a specific room set aside for work at home which 
contained books, ledgers, a typewriter, and company checkbook. Those particular facts of that case 
were determined by the court to be sufficient to uphold decision that the death "arose out of and in 
the course of employment." 
In Jones, v. W.C.A.B.,99 a registered nurse was similarly found to be entitled to compensation 
95207 N.W. 2d 65 (Wise, 1973). 
96Id. at 69 
91
 Supra, note 90 
98464 N.Y.S. 2d 590, 591 (A.D. 3 Dept., 1983). 
"489 A. 2d 1006 (Pa. Comm., 1985). 
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when she was injured on ice on her own walkway while returning home from a client visit, where she 
worked out of her home, set her own schedules to go to clients homes, and handled all reports, calls, 
and similar matters at home, so that the home became an established employment premises. 
The court also found compensation appropriate in Wilson v. Service Broadcasters.1QQ where 
the nature of the reporting business was that stories were required to be written at home, and that 
substantial other preparatory work was required at home before going to film the stories or going to 
the station, so that the home became an established employment premises, so that an injury which 
occurred between the home and the station was properly compensable. Similarly, in Brogger v. 
Kezer,101 an employee fell off a ladder while painting a home, which was also regularly used as the 
company's office. The painting of the home was obviously of benefit to the employee as a home-
owner as well, but the Court noted that it was also of great benefit to the operation of the office and, 
therefore, was a substantial business purpose and compensation was awarded. 
Based upon the variety of such cases, it is fair to say that Professor Larson's conclusions as 
previously set forth are, in fact, reasonably supported by the case law of other jurisdictions. Further, 
as hereinafter more fully discussed in sub-point "E", the cases cited by Employers in their Brief for 
the purpose of establishing to the contrary, fail to adequately support Employers' contentions. 
D. Even if a Home Office Has Not Been Established, Injuries Arising Out of a Hazard 
at Home May, Under The Particular Facts of The Case, Justify an Award of 
Compensation Where an Employee is Expected or Required to Work at Home 
In addition to the true "home office" situation, the courts of other jurisdictions have also 
applied similar tests for compensability where an employee is engaged in work on behalf of the 
employer at home. The dividing line for compensation in those cases hinges on whether the employee 
,00483So. 2d 1339 (Miss, 1986). 
10l626 P. 2d 700 (Colo. App., 1980). 
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has voluntarily chosen to take work home or whether the employee is expected or required to take 
the work home. As a result, compensation has been denied in a number of cases, as reflected in 
Employee's Survey, where the employees had voluntarily chosen to take work home, to do it for his 
or her own convenience. See Glasser v. Youth Shop. Inc.,102 Wilson v. W.C.A.B J0 3 Broich v. New 
York State Union College of Optometry,104 Jacome v. Bonanza Bus Lines.105 and Rowan v. Univ. of 
Nebraska.106 However, compensation has been allowed in a number of cases, also as reflected in 
Employee's Survey, where the employees were expected or required to take the work home. 
Thus, in Moore v. Family Service of Charleston.107 compensation was allowed for an 
employee who was instructed to take four large books and files home to prepare for an interview of 
a client at work in the morning, which she reviewed at home and was then injured as she was coming 
down the stairs with the books tucked under her arm, when they slipped, she grabbed for them, lost 
her balance and fell down the stairs. The Court in Bramall v. W.C.A.B..108 similarly awarded 
compensation where the employee was required to take depositions home for translation, with the 
knowledge of her employer, and she was injured while doing so. In Burchett v. Delton-Kellogg 
School.109 compensation was also allowed where a teacher was injured on her way home from school, 
l0254 So. 2d 686 (Fla., 1951). 
103545 P. 2d 225 (Cal., 1976). 
104498 N.Y.S. 2d 583 (N.Y., 1986). 
105527A.2d218(R.L, 1987). 
106299 N.W. 2d 774 (Neb., 1980). 
107237 S.E. 2d 84 (So. Carol., 1977). 
108144 Cal. Rptr. 105 (App., 1978). 
109144 N.W. 2d 337 (Mich., 1966). 
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when she was required to take books home and do work at home, since there was no time at school 
to do so. See also American Red Cross v. Wilson.110 
Similar awards have also been made in traveling salesman cases, since they are clearly required 
to take their work with them. Thus, in Hampton v. Trimble.1 "compensation was awarded for a 
traveling employee for an injury which occurred on her home driveway, while walking from the car 
to the door of her home. Again, in Tovish v. Gerber Electronics.112 a traveling salesman who was 
injured while shoveling snow to remove an obstacle to exiting his home to visit with customers was 
found to be entitled to compensation, in the same manner as he would have been if the injury had 
occurred off the normal business premises. 
Here again, as more fully discussed in sub-point "E," the cases cited by Employers in their 
Brief to demonstrate that the law is to the contrary, fail to adequately support their contention. 
E. The Specific Cases from Other States Cited by Employers in Their Brief Fail 
to Indicate any Basis for Reversing the Award to Mr. Tjas. 
Employers have cited a number of cases in their Brief in support of the proposition that the 
"case law from other jurisdictions supports a denial of benefits in this case."113 To the contrary, as 
reflected above, and in Employee's Survey, the other jurisdictions provide substantial support to the 
Commission's actions and do not indicate any basis for reversing their award to Mr. Tjas. 
Ralph's Grocery Co. v. W.C.A.B. J14 involved an employee who had been previously laid off 
110519S.W. 2d 60 (Ark., 1975). 
m655N.E. 2d 432 (Ohio, 1995). 
1,2630 A. 2d 136 aff d 642 A. 2d 721 (Conn., 1994). 
113Employers' Brief at 34. 
1,468 Cal. Rptr. 2d 161 (Cal. App., 1997). 
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from work and who had a heart attack at home following a telephone conversation in which his 
former employer offered less than he had anticipated for him to return to work. The court found that 
the claimant was performing absolutely no service for the employer whatsoever at the time of his 
injury. As the Court explained: 
"Where there is liability under the compensation law, 'the right to an award is founded 
not upon the fact that the injury grows out of and is incidental to [the employee's] 
employment, but rather upon the fact that the service [the employee] is rendering at 
the time of the injury grows out of and is incidental to the employment. . ,"115 
In short, the court simply found there was no "causal connection" between the injury and the 
employment. The Court similarly found that no "causal connection" existed between the injury and 
the employment in Roberts v. StellJ16 where a motel manager was injured in a fall on her day off, on 
the walkway outside her apartment door, while leaving to go shopping for groceries where, as the 
court explained, all persons gainfully employed are required to go grocery shopping while off work. 
In Russellville Gas Co. v. Duggar,117 the court rested its decision on its determination that, 
despite the fact that the employee had the truck at home for possible 24 hour deliveries, the employee 
was still injured while simply going out the door to drive to work at the normal time, just as he would 
have done if he had not taken the truck home. The Court explained that their decision may well have 
been different if the same injury had occurred while the employee had been going out to the truck to 
make a delivery for his employer. When other courts have considered such circumstances, under 
slightly different factual patterns, they have, in fact, reached different conclusions. Cf. Black River.1 ] 8 
usId. at 164. 
1I6367N.W. 2dl98(S.D. 1985). 
,17260 So. 2d 393 cert, den. 260 So. 2d 395 (Ala., 1971). 
usSupra, note 95. 
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Glasser119 as previously indicated, is one of those cases in which compensation was denied 
because the employee had voluntarily chosen to take company records home to work on them rather 
than to complete them at his normal work, although he was not required or expected to take that 
work home. The court found that the mere fact that he was walking down the stairs of his home, 
holding those papers, failed to establish that he was injured while engaged in any activity for the 
benefit of the employer. Similarly, in Rowan v. University of Nebraska,120 compensation was again 
denied for a university professor, who was injured while working in his private studio, because he 
had voluntarily chosen to do his art work in that private studio, rather than in available classrooms, 
based on his own preferences. The denials in these two cases are in keeping with the line of cases, 
previously discussed in this Brief, in accordance with which compensation is generally denied when 
the employee voluntarily chose to take work home, although compensation is generally granted when 
the employee was expected or required to take the work home, as in Moore121 and Burchett.122 
Employee respectfully asserts that benefits were improperly denied In Lovd v. Texas 
Employers Insurance Association,123 due to an oversight by the Court. There, the claimant was on 
vacation and painting his house but was on call and he was injured while trying to get down from the 
ladder with his paint and brush in order to answer the ringing telephone. As Employers noted in their 
Brief, the court based its denial on the fact that the claimant was unable to demonstrate that he was 
attempting to respond to a call from his employer when he was injured. The oversight of that court 
U9Supra, note 102. 
m
 Supra, note 106. 
121{Supra, note 107. 
122Supra, note 109. 
123280 S.W. 2d 955 (Tex. Civ. App., 1955). 
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was brought to light by the subsequent Arkansas case of American Red Cross v. Wilson.124 There, 
the Court explained that a court cannot reasonably require such prescience or psychic insight by a 
claimant as to know, prior to answering the phone, whether it is the employee calling (in which event 
it must be answered for business purposes) or some other person calling (in which event it would not 
need to be answered for business purposes). The court explained that, in either event, an employee 
on call was required to answer the phone as part of his duties and if an injury occurs during an 
attempt to do so, the injury may be compensable. The court therefore found that the on-call 
employee in that case was entitled to compensation when she was injured while carrying decorations 
for work down the stairs from her attic and fell while trying to reach a ringing telephone. 
In Danielsen v. Security Van Lines, Inc. J25 the claimant was a salesman-estimator who was 
allowed to set his own hours, allowed to arrange his own work schedule, and allowed to drive a 
company vehicle which was kept parked in a garage a half block from the employee's residence when 
it was not in use. The employee was injured after preparing for work when he fell while descending 
a flight of stairs leading from his apartment. The Court apparently affirmed the denial of benefits 
because he was injured while carrying a bag of garbage which he intended to place in a garbage can 
on the way to the garage, and he had not yet disposed of the garbage nor reached the employer-
provided garage where the vehicle was kept. Under those particular circumstances, the court 
concluded that "he had not as yet crossed the boundary of his employment" at the time of his injuries 
so as to entitle him to compensation. Other cases have reached contrary results under similar, albeit 
mSupra, note 110. 
125l"8So. 2d 609 (La., 1963). 
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somewhat different, fact patterns. See Black Riven l26 Jones v. W.C. A.B..127 and Hollman v. Comfort 
Care, Inc..128 
Fortner v. J.K. Holding Co.,129 similarly provides no support for Employers' contentions. 
There, an employee was told to dispose of some plants at her workplace, with no directions as to the 
manner in which that had to be accomplished. She voluntarily chose to take them home, which if she 
had been injured while transporting them, the court noted, might have established some basis for 
compensation. However, the injuries she suffered occurred while she was standing on a chair in the 
process of actually hanging the plants at home, an activity which the court found was so far removed 
from mere disposition of the plants as to be unot for the benefit of her employer to any appreciable 
extent."130 
Finally, Quaglino v. Ace Bakerv Division of Lakeland Bakers, Inc..131 fails to provide support 
for Employers' contentions that an alleged benefit to an employer must be "substantial" in a work at 
home situation in order to shift the risk of injury to the employer. Rather, that case simply involved 
a determination by the court that the claimant had failed to establish that the employee was actually 
"testing" the device for his employer when he was injured. The court rejected the claim that he was 
"testing" the device for the employer because the equipment had been recently checked out by the 
employer and, further, because the employee, after bringing the device home, had installed a 2-
U6Supra, note 985. 
niSupra, note 99. 
l281999 Okla. Civ. App. LEXIS 58 (Okla. App., 1999). 
129349 S.E. 2d 296 (N.C. Ct. App., 1986). 
mId. at 298. 
I3I275 So. 2d 874 (La. Ct. App., 1973). 
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pronged plug (which resulted in his electrocution) in place of the previously existing 3-pronged plug 
which would not fit his home outlets. The court found that the only "testing" which appeared was 
for the purpose of determining whether his ill-conceived change of plug would allow him to use the 
device for his own purposes at home. Further, the court explained that, even if he had been testing 
the device initially, there was no basis shown why he would have needed to have continued "testing 
the device" down the driveway and 30 or 40 feet beyond the garage. 
F. Home Activities which Prepare an Employee for Work May be 
Compensable, When an Injury Results from Such Activity, Under the 
Particular Facts of the Particular Case 
Owen v. Chrysler Corporation132, is another case which must be viewed under the specific 
facts of the case. It does not, as Employers contend, establish the general proposition that activities 
which are "preparatory" for work at home cannot be compensable. In that case, the employee 
suffered a heart attack as he and his wife were attempting to get the family truck, which was in front 
of the employee's car, freed from a snowbank, so he could bring his car into the garage to load his 
suitcase for a business trip. The employee in that case had been scheduled to take a business trip by 
airplane later that afternoon, but decided, due to the blizzard-like conditions, that he wanted to get 
ready for the trip early that morning. The court simply indicated their determination that trying to 
dig out one vehicle, so the employee could move another vehicle into the garage, so he could put a 
suitcase into it, so he could leave many hours later on a special mission, was simply too far distant 
from that special mission or, as the court stated, "moving the car into the garage for purposes of 
placing a suitcase in the car was at most preparation for the eventuality of travel.."133 
I32371 N.W. 2d 519 (Mich. App., 1985). 
133Id. at 521 (emphasis added). 
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Where the injury at home has not been found to be so far removed from the "eventuality" of 
the business purposes, other courts have awarded compensation. Thus, in Junium v.A.L. Bazzini 
Company, IncJ34 an employee was found to be entitled to compensation when he suffered a heart 
attack during a blizzard, while attempting to shovel the deep snow out of the driveway so he could 
get to work, after receiving a call from the vice-president indicating the employee had to be at the 
office for an important meeting, where otherwise he would likely have stayed home due to the 
weather. Similarly, in TovishJ35 compensation was granted to a traveling salesman for injuries 
suffered while he was shoveling snow to remove the obstacle to his exiting his home in order to travel 
to meet with customers. Also, in Hughes v. New York Telephone Co.,136 compensation was affirmed 
for an off-duty employee who was injured when he stepped on a rake while walking to his car at 
home, preparatory to responding to a request that he check out a report of a broken pole. Finally, 
in Hollman,137, a nurse was granted compensation for an injury she suffered when she slipped on wet 
grass while walking to her car from a residential facility preparatory to travel to visit another client.I38 
In summary, an employee who is injured while engaged in an activity which is preparatory to 
the employment may be entitled to compensation where, under the specific facts of the case, where 
the activity appears intended to provide some real or substantial benefit to the employer. That rule 
is also in keeping with applicable Utah law, as reflected in Moser.139 
I34446 N.Y.S. 2d 520 (N.Y., 1982). 
135Supra, note 112. 
136472 N.Y.S. 2d 513 (N.Y., 1984). 
x31
 Supra, note 128. 
l38See also Black River, supra, note 95. 
l39Supra, note 54. 
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CONCLUSION 
Employers have failed to establish that, under Utah law, the Order of the Commission 
awarding benefits to Mr. Tjas, under the particular circumstances of this case, exceeds "the bounds 
of reasonableness and rationality" and should be set aside by this Court. Utah case law supports the 
award of benefits to Mr. Tjas under these particular factual circumstances, as does the case law of 
other jurisdictions. There is substantial evidence to support the Commission's determination under 
the particular facts of this case, that Mr. Tjas was, indeed, salting the driveway at the time of his 
injury for the specific purpose of allowing the postman to safely negotiate the driveway and make his 
delivery of the expected large, bulky and awkward business package to the Tjas residence, which Mr. 
Tjas knew the postman may be delivering that day. Under such circumstances, where the 
Commission's decision does not exceed "the bounds of reasonableness and rationality," this Court 
should not reverse that award of compensation. 
Respectfully Submitted th i s / J? Day of October, 1999 
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